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Workers' Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*
and J. Benson Ward*
While there was no legislation impacting the Workers' Compensation
Act during the 2013-2014 survey period,1 the period featured notable
decisions of the appellate courts involving core issues of the Act,
including notice, average weekly wage, return to work, and change in
condition.
I.

MEDICAL TREATMENT

In Zheng v. New Grand Buffet, Inc.,2 the Georgia Court of Appeals
considered whether an employee may unilaterally change doctors-to a
doctor not on the panel of physicians-when the employer continues to
provide medical care and also addressed the timing for which an appeal
must be filed with the superior court.' The claimant sustained an
injury and began receiving medical care and income benefits. The
claimant's authorized treating physician (ATP) issued a prospective fullduty work release as of one week of the appointment, depending on test
results and a return evaluation. But instead of returning to the ATP as
scheduled, the claimant presented to a doctor of her own choosing with
whom she continued treatment. The employer subsequently suspended
income benefits on the grounds that the claimant underwent a change
in condition for the better, pursuant to the prospective regular-duty work
release from the claimant's ATP. The claimant filed a hearing request
* Partner in the firm of Drew, Ecld & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1977); University of Georgia (J.D., 1980). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Drew, Ecki & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Georgia (BA, summa cure laude, 2002); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 2005). Member, State Bar of Georgia.

1. For an analysis of Workers' Compensation during the prior survey period, see H.
Michael Bagley & J. Benson Ward, Workers' Compensation,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw,
65 MERCER L. REV. 311 (2013).

2. 321 Ga. App. 308, 740 S.E.2d 302 (2013).
3. Id. at 309, 312, 740 S.E.2d at 304, 306.
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seeking, among other things, reinstatement of income benefits, payment
of certain medical expenses, and a change of ATPs.4
The administrative law judge (ALJ)found that the employer's
suspension of benefits was not improper, but reinstated benefits
beginning shortly after the suspension date on the grounds that the
employer did not prove the claimant had undergone a change in
condition for the better. The claimant alleged that the insurance
adjuster had represented that no panel of physicians existed, and so she
was free to select any doctor of her choice as the ATP. However, the
ALJ found that the employer had a valid panel of physicians and
therefore should have the opportunity to offer the claimant treatment
with another doctor of the employer's choice. The Appellate Division of
the State Board of Workers' Compensation (the Appellate Division)
adopted the ALJ's award, and the superior court did not issue an opinion
within twenty days of the hearing. Thus, the decision of the State Board
of Workers' Compensation (the Board) was affirmed by operation of
law.6
The court of appeals found no error in the AL's findings, noting
evidence existed to show that a valid panel of physicians was posted and
explained to the claimant.6 The court noted that the claimant's remedy,
if she was dissatisfied with her ATP, was either to request a change of
doctors with the employer or "petition the Board for approval to change,
but [the claimant] was not entitled to change physicians unilaterally and
require her employer to pay for it."7 The court refused to consider the
employer's purported cross-appeal, holding that section 34-9-105(b) of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)8 requires a party to
appeal the Board's final order within twenty days of that order and does
not provide additional time for a cross-appeal.9 Because the employer
did not file a notice of appeal to the superior court within twenty days
of the Appellate Division award, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction
to consider the appeal.1"

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 308-10, 740 S.E.2d at 303-05.
Id. at 308-09, 311, 740 S.E.2d at 304-05.
Id. at 312, 740 S.E.2d at 306.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) (2008).
Zheng, 321 Ga. App. at 313, 740 S.E.2d at 307; see also O.C.G.A. 34-9-105(b).
Zheng, 321 Ga. App. at 313, 740 S.E.2d at 307.
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II. FRAUD AND NON-COMPLIANCE
Garcia v. Shaw Industries, Inc." involved a claimant's civil suit
against an employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation after the employer filed an administrative fraud complaint
with the Board. The claimant, who was not a United States citizen,
obtained employment with the name and Social Security number of
another. While working for the employer, she sustained a compensable
injury and began receiving benefits.
After obtaining deposition
testimony from the claimant that the name and Social Security number
she had used were not hers, the employer fired her. The employer
continued to pay temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits but filed a
complaint with the fraud and compliance unit of the Board, alleging that
the claimant made false and misleading representations for the purpose
of obtaining workers' compensation benefits. Following communications
between the fraud unit and counsel for the employer, the claimant was
arrested after a deposition.' 2
The claimant brought a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and defamation." The employer argued that its actions in
filing the fraud complaint were protected from liability under O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-24,14 which "provides a safe harbor for persons who '[in the
absence of fraud or malice' furnish the Board with information regarding
suspected fraud." 5
Declining to rule on whether the statute protected the employer from
liability, the court of appeals held that the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment because a rational jury could not reasonably
conclude that the employer's conduct was extreme and outrageous as
required for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.'"
The defamation claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.17
III.

LATE-PAYMENT PENALTY/CHANGE IN CONDITION

In Reid v. MetropolitanAtlanta Rapid Transit Authority,"8 the court
of appeals addressed a claimant's request for late-payment penalties

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

321 Ga. App. 48, 741 S.E.2d 285 (2013).
Id. at 48-50, 54, 741 S.E.2d at 286-87, 290.
Id. at 48, 741 S.E.2d at 286.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-24 (2008).
Garcia,321 Ga. App. at 50, 741 S.E.2d at 287 (quoting O.C.GA § 34-9-24(d)).
Id. at 52-54, 741 S.E.2d at 288-89.
Id. at 54-55, 741 S.E.2d at 290-91; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (2007).
323 Ga. App. 523, 746 S.E.2d 779 (2013).
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made more than eight years after the last payment of indemnity
benefits. 9 The claimant sustained a compensable injury and received
a total of thirty-two indemnity payments, of which twelve were made
untimely, before returning to work.'0 When, eight years later, the
claimant requested payment by the employer of the 15% late-payment
penalty under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(e), 21 the employer refused and the
claimant requested a hearing.2 2 Following stipulated facts, the ALJ
found that the claim for statutory penalties constituted a change in
condition under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-10423 because additional benefits were
requested, and the claim was therefore barred under that statute's twoyear limitation period. This decision was affirmed by the Appellate
Division and the superior court.24
The court of appeals reversed and applied the general statute of
limitations, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82,25 instead of the change of condition
statute of limitations. 26 The court noted that O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)
defines the term "change in condition" to be "a change in the wageearning capacity, physical condition, or status of an employee," and then
stated that the claimant was not alleging physical or economic
change-though curiously the court ignored O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)s third
prong, "a change in ... status."27 Instead, the court held that the
applicable statute of limitations was the one contained in O.C.G.A. § 349-82, and thus as long as the initial claim for benefits was filed in a
timely fashion, a claimant is not time-barred from requesting "payment
of compensation which accrued and is owed."' The court noted that
"some may view [its holding] as absurd," and intimated that the
legislature should fix what the court perceived as a statutory deficiency.2 9 The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in September
2014, reversed the court of appeals.3 0

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 523-24, 746 S.E.2d at 780-81.
Id. at 523-24, 746 S.E.2d at 780.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(e) (2008).
Reid, 323 Ga. App. at 524, 746 S.E.2d at 780.

23. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104 (2008).
24.
25.
26.
27.
marks
28.
29.
30.

Reid, 323 Ga. App. at 524, 746 S.E.2d at 780-81.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82 (2008).
Reid, 323 Ga. App. at 527, 746 S.E.2d at 782.
Id. at 526, 746 S.E.2d at 782 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)) (internal quotation
omitted).
Id. at 528, 746 S.E.2d at 782-83.
Id. at 528, 746 S.E.2d at 783.
Metro Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Reid, No. S13G1812, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 709

(Sept. 22, 2014), reconsideration denied, No. S13G1812, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 851 (Oct. 20,

2014).
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IV. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION
For the third consecutive year, this survey addresses the Pitts
matter.31 During this survey period, in Estate of Pitts v. City of Atlanta.
(Pitts III),32 the court of appeals revisited the case upon remand from
the supreme court.3
The Pitts matter arose when a construction
worker was struck and killed by a vehicle driven by the employee of
another subcontractor on the project. The decedent's estate recovered a
judgment against the subcontractor who employed the vehicle's driver,
but the judgment was not satisfied because of a lack of insurance. The
estate then brought suit against the city and several construction
companies on the project on grounds that the companies breached
contractual duties in their subcontracts that required each subcontractor
to carry a minimum amount in automobile liability insurance. On
remand, following an extended analysis and construction of the Owner's
Controlled Insurance Policy and relevant terms, the court of appeals
again concluded that the deceased employee was a "participant" in the
construction project intending to benefit from the coverages provided by
the master insurance program set forth in the Owner's Controlled
35
Insurance Policy.

Turning to the question of whether the exclusive remedy provision
barred the estate's claims, the court referred to and upheld its analysis
from Estate of Pitts v. City of Atlanta (Pitts 1),31 wherein the court
concluded that the exclusive remedy provision did not apply to bar the
estate from bringing suit against the subcontractor responsible for the
accident because that subcontractor was not an employee of the worker's
employer nor a party to any contract under which it provided workers'
compensation benefits to the worker, and because the injury for which
the estate sought damages was not a physical injury but rather the loss
of access to insurance coverage due to the alleged breach of contract.3 7

31. See generally Bagley & Ward, supra note 1, at 321-22; H. Michael Bagley & J.
Benson Ward, Workers' Compensation,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 64 MERCER L. REV.
341, 345-46 (2012).
32. 323 Ga. App. 70, 746 S.E.2d 698 (2013).
33. Id. at 70, 746 S.E.2d at 699; see also Archer W. Contractors, Ltd. v. Estate of Pitts
(Pitts11), 292 Ga. 219, 230, 735 S.E.2d 772, 781 (2012).
34. PittsIII, 323 Ga. App. at 70-71, 746 S.E.2d at 699.
35. Id. at 76-84, 746 S.E.2d at 702-08; see also Estate of Pitts v. City of Atlanta (Pitts
1), 312 Ga. App. 599, 603-04, 719 S.E.2d 7, 12 (2011).
36. 312 Ga.App. 599, 719 S.E.2d 7 (2011).
37. Pitts111, 323 Ga. App. at 87, 746 S.E.2d at 710; Pitts 1, 312 Ga. App. at 605-07, 719
S.E.2d at 13-14.
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In Dawson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.," the court of appeals addressed
whether the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act)39 covered an employee who was kidnapped and physically and sexually assaulted while
4
The
,walking across the employer's parking lot to begin her shift.
was
that
employer
the
against
suit
employee brought a personal injury
4 ' The
judgment.
summary
for
motion
dismissed on the employer's
court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the exclusive-remedy provision
barred the civil suit.42 The court observed that the issue regarding
whether assaults are subject to the exclusive-remedy provision-specifically whether the assault arose out of the employment-is fact
specific."3 As a general rule, an assault will arise out of the employment-and thus fall within the Act-when the intentional injury was not
The court
directed against the employee for personal reasons."
dismissed as speculation the employee's contention that a question of
fact existed regarding whether the attack was personal because she
resembled the attacker's girlfriend.4 Instead, the court concluded that
the employee and her attacker were previously unknown to each other,
the attack was random, and the employee was walking from the parking
lot into the store to commence her shift.46 Accordingly, the court
upheld the application of the exclusive-remedy provision.47
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Royal v. Pulaski State Prison4" is the latest example in the longstanding series of cases holding that the findings of the Board are
binding when supported by any evidence.4 9 The claimant suffered an
injury to her lungs after inhaling chlorine bleach fumes. The employer
accepted the claim on a medical-only basis and provided medical care,
and the claimant returned to work after missing only five days. Roughly
three weeks after returning to work, the claimant saw her family doctor
and was diagnosed as having pneumonia. After hospitalization, the

38. 324 Ga. App. 604, 751 S.E.2d 426 (2013), cert. denied.
39. O.C.G.A. tit. 34 ch. 9 (2008 & Supp. 2014).

40. Dawson, 324 Ga. App. at 604, 751 S.E.2d at 427.
41. Id. at 606, 751 S.E.2d at 428.
42. Id. at 609, 751 S.E.2d at 431.
43. See id. at 607, 751 S.E.2d at 429.
44. See id. at 607-09, 751 S.E.2d at 429-30.
45. Id. at 609, 751 S.E.2d at 430.
46. Id. at 609, 751 S.E.2d at 430-31.
47. Id. at 609, 751 S.E.2d at 431.
48. 324 Ga. App. 275, 750 S.E.2d 179 (2013).
49. Id. at 276, 750 S.E.2d at 180; see also Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. King, 281 Ga. 853,
854, 642 S.E.2d 841, 843 (2007).
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claimant was released to return to work with the restriction of avoiding
strong chemical fumes. The employer did not accommodate this
restriction, the claimant ceased working, and after almost twenty
months of leave her employment was terminated. The claimant alleged
she was entitled to temporary total-disability (TTD) benefits and medical
care because her sensitivity to strong chemical fumes was caused by her
on-the-job accident. The employer contended that the claimant had
recovered from her exposure and returned to work, and any subsequent
disability was unrelated. After reviewing extensive medical evidence,
the ALJ found that the claimant had numerous long-standing ailments,
that the claimant had misrepresented facts to medical providers, and
that she had been released to return to work after the inhalation injury
and did in fact return to work. The ALJ concluded that the claimant
had not met her burden of proving she was disabled as a result of the
inhalation injury. The Appellate Division and the superior court
affirmed.5 ° The court of appeals held that the record contained some
evidence to support the ALJ's conclusions, and therefore, the Board's
findings were conclusive and binding.5'
VI.

AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE

In Cho Carwash Property,LLC v. Everett,5 2 the parties disputed the
calculation of a brand-new employee's average weekly wage. The
claimant, who had only worked three days before his accident, contended
that he was hired to work full time (at least forty hours per week) and
that he worked a full day on the first day of his employment and
reduced hours on the second day because business was slow due to rain.
The employer contended that the claimant was hired to work part-time,
was in training at the time of the accident, and would only have become
a full-time employee after training was complete.53 The AJ determined that neither subsection (1) nor (2) of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2604 was
applicable for determining the average weekly wage, and instead
calculated the "full-time weekly wage" based on the employer's testimony
regarding hours of business for a full-time employee.55 The Appellate
Division accepted the ALJ's findings, the superior court affirmed, and
the court of appeals agreed, ruling that some evidence existed to support

50. Royal, 324 Ga. App. at 276-79, 750 S.E.2d at 180-82.
51. Id. at 280, 750 S.E.2d at 183.
52. 326 Ga. App. 6, 755 S.E.2d 823 (2014).

53. Id. at 7, 755 S.E.2d at 823-24.
54. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-260(1)-(2) (2008).
55. Cho Carwash Prop., LLC, 326 Ga. App. at 7, 755 S.E.2d at 824.
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the AIJ's calculation of average weekly wage, and therefore, the Board's
findings must be upheld.5 6
VII. NOTICE
In McAdoo v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority,

the

claimant, a bus driver for twenty-two years, began to experience pain in
his lower back and right leg in May 2010 and sought treatment with his

primary-care physician, who also treated him for diabetes. The claimant
continued to work and began to drive by shifting his weight and using
his left foot to operate the brakes until his supervisor told him that it
was unsafe to switch feet and that he needed to "get [himselfl taken care
of." He eventually ceased working because of the pain on October 17,
2010, though it was not until April 18, 2011 that a doctor opined that
the lower-back and right-leg pain were work-related. Following a
hearing on the claimant's request for income and medical benefits, the
AIJ found that the claimant sustained a gradual-onset spine injury
because of his driving. The Appellate Division agreed and concentrated
on the issue of notice, finding that notice was shown in the employer's
instructions to the claimant to avoid driving with his left leg and to "get
[himselfl taken care of." Alternatively, the Appellate Division also
concluded that the employer was not prejudiced even if notice was
insufficient in October 2010.58
The superior court agreed that the date of injury was the last date
worked and the injury arose out of the employment, but found that the
claimant left work because of his diabetes. Further, the court found that
any notice to the employer only pertained to the diabetes, and thus
59
The court of
concluded that notice was insufficient and reversed.
liberally and
be
construed
must
notice
that
observing
disagreed,
appeals
timely
provided
claimant
the
either
that
found
Board
the
noting that
the
thus
and
so,
doing
not
for
excuse
reasonable
a
had
or
notice
0
to
existed
evidence
some
Because
prejudiced.
not
employer was
the
in
reversing
erred
court
superior
the
support the Board's conclusion,
61
Board's award based on failure to provide timely notice. With respect
to the employer's appeal on the issue of whether the injury arose out of
the employment, the court similarly held that some evidence existed in

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 8, 755 S.E.2d at 825.
326 Ga. App. 788, 755 S.E.2d 278 (2014).
Id. at 788-90, 755 S.E.2d at 280-81.
Id. at 790, 755 S.E.2d at 281.
Id. at 791-92, 755 S.E.2d at 281-82.
Id. at 792, 755 S.E.2d at 282.
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the record to support the Board's finding that the injury was jobrelated."2
VIII. CONVERSION FROM TTD TO TPD
In Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Thompson,' the
court of appeals considered whether an employer may include the time
period during which a claimant performs light-duty work when
determining whether the fifty-two-week period of O.C.G.A. § 34-9104(a)(2) has been reached.'
The claimant sustained a compensable
injury and received benefits. When she was released to return to lightduty work, the employer served a Form WC-104, advising the claimant
that her TTD benefits would be converted from TTD to TPD after fiftytwo consecutive weeks at light-duty status. Shortly after the WC-104
was served, the claimant returned to work in the employer's transitional
light-duty program, and the employer suspended TTD benefits. The
employer withdrew the light-duty job after one year. As the claimant
was unable to return to regular-duty work, she ceased working and the
employer recommenced TTD benefits.
Several months later, the
employer filed a WC-2 suspending TTD benefits and commencing TPD
benefits, pursuant to the WC-104.65
The claimant requested reinstatement of lTTD benefits, to which the
employer contended that under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)(2) it was
permitted to unilaterally convert from TTD to TPD benefits because the
claimant was not working and had remained at light-duty work status
for fifty-two consecutive weeks. The AJ found that the employer was
not allowed to consider the period the claimant actually worked in
determining when the fifty-two consecutive light-duty weeks had been
reached, and the Appellate Division and superior court affirmed.6" The
court of appeals agreed that an employer cannot include the period of
time an employee works when calculating the fifty-two-week period
under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)(2). 67 In support of this conclusion, the
court stated that the purpose of the statute-to give employees an
incentive to return to work-is not met when an employer reduces the
benefits of an employee who, through no fault of her own, is unable to
return to work because the employer no longer made light-duty work

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 793, 755 S.E.2d at 283.
326 Ga. App. 631, 757 S.E.2d 228 (2014), cert. granted.
Id. at 631, 757 S.E.2d at 229-30; see also O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)(2).
Thompson, 326 Ga. App. at 632, 757 S.E.2d at 230.
Id.
Id. at 634, 757 S.E.2d at 231.
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available. 68 The court also affirmed the ALJ's award of attorney fees
because evidence supported the AL's finding that the employer acted
without reasonable grounds in its unilateral conversion from TTD to
TPD.69
IX.

BOARD RuLE 240: RETURN TO WORK

In Technical College System of Georgia v. McGruder,7 ° the court of
appeals examined the effect of an employer's refusal to immediately
recommence benefits, pursuant to Rule 240 of the State Board of
2
Workers' Compensation, v' after a failed light-duty job attempt. The
claimant sustained a compensable back injury while working as a
custodian and received TTD benefits until she returned to work in a
light-duty job as a phone operator, pursuant to a light-duty job offer
made by the employer under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240. 7" The claimant
ceased working after nine days and returned on the tenth day with a
letter from her primary-care physician stating that in addition to her
work injury the claimant had other serious medical problems and "was
unable to work in any job in any capacity."7 4 The employer did not
recommence benefits, and the claimant requested a hearing, seeking
TTD benefits for the time since she left the light-duty job.75
After the hearing, the ALJ denied the request for benefits, finding that
the light-duty work was within restrictions, and the claimant ceased
working for reasons unrelated to the on-the-job injury. The ALJ also
determined that Board Rule 240(c)(i),76 which provides that an employer who does not immediately recommence benefits after a failed WC-240
job attempt has waived its defense of suitability of employment,
exceeded the Board's rule-making authority and was invalid. On appeal,
the Board vacated the ALJ's award and remanded. On remand, the AJ
found that the claimant had stopped working due to medical reasons
unrelated to her work injury, but that the employer waived its defense
of suitability of employment when it failed to reinstate benefits. The

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 634-35, 757 S.E.2d at 232.
Id. at 636, 757 S.E.2d at 233.
326 Ga. App. 469, 756 S.E.2d 702 (2014).
O.C.G.A. § 34 app. r. 240 (2008 & Supp. 2014).
McGruder,326 Ga. App. at 469-70, 756 S.E.2d at 703.
Id. at 469, 756 S.E.2d at 703; see also O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240 (2008 & Supp. 2014).
McGruder, 326 Ga. App. at 469, 756 S.E.2d at 703.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 34 app. r. 240(c)(i).

2014]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Appellate Division and the superior court both affirmed the ALJ's
decision.77
On appeal, the court of appeals agreed that the claimant attempted
the light-duty job for more than a week but less than fifteen days, and
thus O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240(bXl) expressly required the employer to
reinstate benefits.7" The employer's failure to do so resulted in a
waiver of its defense of suitable employment.79 The court also held that
Rule 240 does not exceed the Board's rule-making authority 0 Rule
240 only applies to an employer's position regarding "its obligation to
reinstate TTD benefits for a compensable injury it was already required
to pay."8 The proper approach is for the employer to immediately
reinstate benefits and seek a hearing to recover reimbursement of such
benefits.82
X. ATTORNEY FEES
The court of appeals dealt with several attorney fee issues during the
survey period. In Cho v. Mountain Sweet Water, Inc., 3 the claimant
sustained an injury and filed a hearing request seeking indemnity
benefits, penalties under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(e),84 attorney fees under
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b)(1) and (2),5 and "other ...

additional penalties

and attorney fees." 6 Accordingly, the Board issued a hearing notice
which stated that "the issues to be determined included those listed on
the claim notice as well as penalties pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-126."87
The Board also issued an order requiring the employer to submit
evidence of its compliance with O.C.G.A. § 34-9-120,8 which requires
employers to procure workers' compensation insurance.8 9

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

McGruder, 326 Ga. App. at 470, 756 S.E.2d at 703-04.
Id. at 471, 756 S.E.2d at 704.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 472, 756 S.E.2d at 705.
See id.

83. 322 Ga. App. 400, 745 S.E.2d 663 (2013).
84. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(e) (2008 & Supp. 2014).

85. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b)(1)-(2) (2008 & Supp. 2014).
86. Mountain Sweet Water, Inc., 322 Ga. App. at 400, 745 S.E.2d at 664 (alteration in
original).
87. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 34-9-126 (2008).
88. O.C.G.A. § 39-9-120 (2008).

89. Mountain Sweet Water, Inc., 322 Ga. App. at 400, 745 S.E.2d at 664-65; see also
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-120 ("Every employer subject to the compensation provisions of this
chapter shall insure the payment of compensation to his employees .... ").
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At the hearing, the claimant argued he was entitled to attorney fees
due to the employer's bad faith in refusing the claim and denying his
employee status, but apparently did not argue entitlement to attorney
fees because of the employer's lack of insurance. The AIJ did not award
attorney fees, finding that the employer's defense of the claim was not
unreasonable under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b)(1), and did not address the
availability of attorney fees under another section of the Act. The
claimant requested an amended award to address attorney fees under
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-126(b), but the ALJ found that the claimant had not
raised the issue at the hearing and therefore waived any claims for
attorney fees. The Appellate Division and the superior court both
affirmed the ALJ's ruling.9 ° The court of appeals upheld the AU's
ruling under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b)(1) but held that the claimant did not
waive his claims for attorney fees and remanded to the ALJ for
consideration of the attorney fee claims under O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-108(b)(2)
and 34-9-126(b). 91 In so holding, the court noted that the claimant's
hearing request "stated each of the three grounds for a fee award," the
ALJ award initially noted the claimant sought an award under O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-126(b), "the Board's show cause order listed compliance with
OCGA § 34-9-126 as an issue to be determined, and [the claimant's]
2
attorney presented argument seeking attorney fees at the hearing.1
In Heritage Healthcare of Toccoa v. Ayers,93 the employer fired the
claimant the day after she reported an injury, refused payment but did
not controvert the claim, eventually accepted the claim by paying
accrued TTD and commencing weekly benefits, and paid the 15% latepayment penalty two days before the hearing. Consequently, the only
issue before the ALJ was whether to assess attorney fees. The AM
rejected the request for fees, but the Appellate Division found that the
claimant's attorney was entitled to attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 34-9108(b)(1) and (2), and expenses under (b)(4),' and assessed attorney
fees in a lump-sum amount based on the amount of TTD benefits from
the date of the accident through the hearing date. On claimant's appeal,
the superior court ruled that claimant's counsel was also entitled to addon attorney fees of 25% of all future benefits and up to 25% of the latepayment penalty amount.95 The court of appeals concluded that
because the Board found that the employer's defense lacked reasonable

90.
91.
92.

Mountain Sweet Water, Inc., 322 Ga. App. at 400-01, 745 S.E.2d at 665.
Id. at 402-03, 745 S.E.2d at 666.
Id.

93. 323 Ga. App. 172, 746 S.E.2d 744 (2013).
94.
95.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(bX4) (2008 & Supp. 2014).
See Ayers, 323 Ga. App. at 172-76, 746 S.E.2d at 745-47.
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grounds, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b)(1) authorized assessed attorney fees up
to 25% of weekly benefits, and the attorney fee of 25% provided for in
the attorney-fee contract was a reasonable fee.9" The court held that,
in light of the Board's findings, the Board should have ordered the
employer to pay add-on penalties of 25% on all future TTD payments as
a reasonable quantum meruit fee.97 The court also held that the
attorney fee amount should have included 25% of the late-payment
penalty paid to the claimant two days before the hearing because
penalties under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221 are part of the compensation.98
The dissent argued that the Appellate Division properly determined the
reasonable amount of the attorney's quantum meruit fee based upon the
evidence before it, and the superior court erred in substituting its
findings for those of the Appellate Division.9 9

96. Id. at 175-76, 746 SXE.2d at 747.
97. See id. at 177, 746 S.E.2d at 747-48. The dissent notes that the Appellate Division
"determined that the claimant's attorney was entitled to 'quantum meruit' fees of 25
percent" of TTD benefits. Id. at 178, 746 S.E.2d 748 (Branch, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 176-77, 746 S.E.2d at 747 (majority opinion).
99. Id. at 178, 746 S.E.2d at 748 (Branch, J., dissenting).

